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IN THE SUPREME COURI' OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH I 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
KENNETH EUGENE G01'FREY I 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 15804 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal proceeding brought by the State of Utah 
against Kenneth Eugene Gotfrey charging him with one oount of Forcible 
Sodany, two counts of Rape, and two oounts of Forcible SWxual Abuse in 
violation of sections 76-5-403, 76-5-402, and 76-5-404 Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, as arrended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE IrnER COURI' 
The defendant was found guilty in the District Court of the 
Seventh Judicial District in and for Carbon County, State of Utah, on 
March 21, 1978, after a jury trial, of Forcible Sod.any and two counts 
of Rape. The Defendant waived time for pronounc:errent of judgrrent and 
the Court on March 21, 1978 sentenced the Defendant to serve a term 
of 1-15 years on Count I, Forcible Sodomy, and two terms of 5 years 
to life for Rape on Counts II and III, all sentences to run oon=rently. 
- I -
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an Order of this Court reversing the judgme~ 
and verdict rendered at trial and a ruling remanding the cause tot~ 
Trial Court for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF F/.\CTS 
At trial Michael Gene Garcia, a sixteen year old step-son of tne 
defendant, testified that he was deer hunting with defendant on October 
23, l 976, in Carbon County, Utah. Michael and the defendant and a youn~ 
cousin of Michael were sleeping in a tent when Michael was awakened by 
defendant's hand over his mouth. (T. 51). The Defendant then took down 
Michael's pants, ordered Michael to be quiet, and then placed hismoutn 
over Michael's sexual organ. (T. 51). Michael stated that he did not do 
this willingly but that the defendant held him so that he couldn't get 
up. (T. 51). On cross-examination Michael testified that a cousin was 
in the tent at the time (T. 55, 67, 68) and that an Uncle and four to 
six friends of the uncle were outside around a campfire approximately 
fifteen to twenty feet away at the time of the attack. (T. 56). 
On direct examination Defendant admitted that he was deer huntin~ 
with Michael of October 23, 1976, but denied that he attacked Mi~~l oo 
that date or any other time. (T. 159, 160). 
With regard to Count II, Petrita Garcia, a step-daughter of the 
defendant, tes ti fi ed that she was raped by the Defendant approximately 
twenty to fifty times, and in particular, on September 11, 1975, while 
she was twelve years old. The attack allegedly took place in the familY 
mobile home at We 11 i ngton, Utah while the mother was in the hos pita 1 · 
(T. 6, 7). Petrita fUrther testified that she never told anyone that she 
had been raped. (T. 14). 
2 
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With respect to Count III, Rosie Garcia testified that she was 
a step-daughter of the defendant and that he raped her in their mobile 
home at Wellington, Utah on March 15, 1977, while she was then twelve 
years old and while her mother was away at church. (T. 20, 21). She 
also testified that she had had intercourse with the Defendant on 
forty to fifty occasions. (T. 23, 25). 
On direct examination the Defendant denied any acts of abuse or 
intercourse with either Petrita or Rosie. (T. 164). 
POINTS ON APPEAL 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICTS. 
The Defendant contends that the conviction of the Defendant of 
Forcible Sodomy and two counts of Rape is not supported by the evidence. 
A. The conviction for Forcible Sodomy. The testimony of the 
alleged victim, Michael Gene Garcia, was incredible, suspicious, and 
inherently contradictory. The victim would have the jury believe that the 
Defendant committed ant of Sodomy upon him while deer hunting on October 
23, 1976. (T. 51) This supposedly occurred in the presence of a cousin 
of Michael who was sleeping at his feet. (T. 68). The victim even contends 
that he was being attacked while he was kicking the cousin to awaken him. 
(T. 68). 
Michael also testified that there were at least four to six other 
adults around a campfire fifteen to twenty feet away. (T. 59, 67). It 
would indeed seem incredible that the victim of a reprehensible attack 
would remain mute when assistance was so readily available. 
The testimony of Michael was also inconsistent and contradicted 
3 
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a previous statement made to a juvenile probation officer, Brian Matsu~; 
Mr. Matsuda, cal led as awitness by the plaintiff, testified on cross. 
examination that Michael- Garcia had told him on June 24, 1977, that the 
Defendant had attacked Michael while deer hunting by forcing Michael to 
pl ace his mouth upon the sexual organ of the Defendant. (T. 97). Mr. 
Matsuda also testified that there was no misunderstanding as to h~ 
Michael related the facts of the alleged Sodomy. (T. 100, 101). Yet 
Michael testified on direct examination that the Sodomy consisted of tn; 
Defendant p 1 acing his mouth upon the sexua 1 organ of Mi cha el. (T. 51, ol 
So gross an inconsistency as to who performed the act upon w~m 
certainly raises suspicion as to whether the attack ever occurred and 
further renders the events testified to by Michael Garcia incredible. JI 
very nature of this type of an attack suggests that it is an act not per· 
formed in the near presence of persons who might discover the activity. 
One further wonders why, if the attack occurred, no effective resistance 
was offered. The victim testified that he dared not yell for help (U1'. 
but yet he dared to kick his cousin for help. (T.68). 
It is clear from the record that Michael harbored considerable 
animosity toward the Defendant and it is not beyond belief that Michael 
would falsely accuse the Defendant of a detestable offense. Michael toli 
Mr. James Still, prior to trial, that "I'm setting up my stepfather." 
(T. 144). Michael also told Mr. Toby Vigil that he would have his rela· 
ti ves take care of the Defendant if the Defendant were sent to prison. 
(T. 149). It also appears that Michael was selling personal property 
belonging to the Defendant during the time the Defendant was incarcero 
ated pending trial. (T. 133). Michael himself tesitified that he had 
held a .22 rifle on his stepfather (T. 60,61), that they had numerous 
4 
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arguments (T. 60), that they had fist fights (T. 60), and that they had 
a conflict over a girl friend of Michael sleeping at Defendant's home. 
(T.73). 
In view of the conflict existing between the Defendant and Michael 
the testimony of Michael becomes more suspicious in view of the signifi-
cant inconsistent statement previously referred to. 
B. The Conviction for Rape. The testimony of Rosie and Petrita 
Garcia to the effect that they had been raped by the Defendant was incredible 
and suspicious. At the time the attack on Petrita allegedly took place on 
Sept. 11, 1975, the victim was at home with her two sisters who were 
watching TV. (T. 9, 11). Even though one of the sisters knew the attack 
was taking place she did not attempt to go for help to anyone else in the 
trailer court. (T. 13). Petrita also testified that similar attacks had 
previously occurred on twenty to fifty occasions. (T. 7) Yet none of the 
attacks were reported to anyone, not even the mother. (T. 14) 
Rosie Garcia testified that she had been raped by the Defendant on 
March 15, 1977 in their ·mobile hime while the mother was away at church. 
(T. 21). She further testified that the Defendant had raped her ·On 40-
50 other occasions (T. 25) but that she told no one except a friend named 
Darla. (T. 30). She further testified that many of the other attacks 
took place in the presence of a sister (T. 25)and while the mother was at 
home. (T. 24). Yet the mother, Mrs. Rosie Gotfrey, testified that she never 
suspected or had reason to suspect that any type of an illicit on-going 
relationship existed between the Defendant and Rosie and Petrita. (T. 40). 
It strains the imagination to believe that the Defendant could have 
raped each girl up to fifty times, many whil~ the mother was at home, and 
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! 
in the presence of another sister, without arousing the suspicion of Uie I 
mother. One questions whether the attacks actually occurred if they weri 
not reported to the mother until June of 1977. (L 40). In particular, 
the remoteness of the supposed attack on Sept. 11, 1975, from the date 11 
was reported seriously detracts from the credibility of the story presen\' I 
by Petrita. 
It is also significant to note that the attack upon Petrita on 
September· 11, 1975, was not corroborated by Rosie Garcia who was at ho~ 
at the time and supposedly had knowledge of the attack. (T.12). 
By way of summary, the stories of the three victims are incredioi1 
and suspicious. Defendant submits that because of the inherent improbaoil 
of the stories the verdicts were not supported by the evidence. The con· 
viction should "be scrutinized with great care because it is a charge fo 
to make and hard to defend against" , a principle with which this Courti;I 
in accord. State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 347 P.2d 865 at 868, (Utah 195~) 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF A PSYCHOLOG!Sl· 1 
PATIENT PRIVILEGE. 
Bobby Joe Fredrickson was called as a witness by the Plaintiff. IL 
He testified that he was a clinical psychologist at Four Corners Mental 
Health in Price and in that capacity had a therapy contact with the Oefen~! 
on July l, 1977. (T. llO, 111, 117) Over Defendant's objection the Trial 
I 
d ni· 
·court permitted Mr. Fredrickson to testify that the Defendant had tol , 
that the Defendant had had sexual intercourse with his two daughters. (T. ··1 
. tremelY Defendant contends this testimony by Mr. Fredrick son was ex · I 
6 ! Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
prejudicial and that the psychologist-patient privilege is applicable in 
this situation. Accordingly, the Trial Court should have sustained the 
objection to the testimony of Mr. Fredrickson. {T. 111). 
The statutory privilege claimed by Defendant is set forth in 
Section 58-25-8 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended: 
A psychologist licensed under the provisions of this act 
cannot, without the consent of his client or patient, be 
examined in a civil or criminal action as to any infor-
mation acquired in the course of his professional services 
in behalf of the client ... 
Although Mr. Fredrickson did not obtain a license pursuant to the pro-
cedure set forth in the Act at Section 58-25-2 {T. 110, 111), he was a 
clinical psychologist employed by a governmental agency, Four Corners 
Mental Health. The Act, however, exempts a psychologist from the licensing 
requirements if he is employed as a psychologist by a governmental agency: 
.... No person may represent himself to be a psychologist 
unless he is licensed under the provisions of this act or 
exempted under the provisions of 58-25-6. 
Sec. 58-25-5, Utah Code Annotated 
And Section 58-25-6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, provides: 
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to limit the activities, 
and use of official titles on the part of a person in the em-
ploy of a federal, state, county, or municipal agency, or other 
political subdivision, ... , in so far that such activities 
and services are a part of the duties in his salaried position, 
and in so far that such activities or services are performed 
solely on behalf of his employer. 
It is apparent that Mr. Fredrickson clearly falls within the ex-
ception of ·Section 58- 25-6 since he is an employee of Four Corners Mental 
Health and that he therefore is exempted from the licensing requirements of 
the act. Inasmuch as the exempted psychologist is allowed to engage in 
substantially the same duties and activities as the licensed psychologist, 
there appears no logical reason why the privilege should not apply in the 
event a patient sees a psychologist employed by a governmental agency as 
7 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
opposed to one in private practice. In this particular instance the 
Defendant was engaging in therapy much the same as if he had consulted i 
a psychologist in private practice. A person willing to enter in to u,,l 
ought to be able to do so, feeling that his conversations will be held 
confidential. It would seem that this is especially true where a goverri· 
menta 1 agency holds itself out as being a mental health center and ther; 
clothes itself with the appearance of being a quasi-medica~ body. The 
very concept of a mental health clinic implies that there be honest and 
accurate communication between psychologist and patient. If the privilc: 
is not extended to those psychologists working for a governmental agenq 
the free flow of communication theory will be thwarted and the conceptof 
honesty between psychologist and patient suffers a chilling effect. Nol! 
that even Mr. Fredrickson was under the impression that the therapy se11ic 
was confidential. (T. 114). 
patient 
I 
It would also seem proper to uphold the privilege of psychologi11·1 
in this instance on an agency theory,i .e. ,that if a certifiedor 
licensed psychologist referred the patient to another psychologist inili 
Four Corners Mental Health Center the credentials of the ref error oughtt 
the 
fl ow to psycho l gist to whom the patient was referred. To not so hold wo1': 
place upon the patient the burden of determining the qualifications ofeli' 
person with whom he engages in therapy contact. This principle is import! 
in the case at bar for the reason that Mr. Fredrickson testified ~~W 
Defendant was referred by Mr. Fredrickson's supervisor. (T. 121) andtt!: 
four or five other psychologists had been working with the Defendant.(\. 
This in itself would place an impermissible burden on the Defendant to 
determine what things he would be able to discuss with which psychologii' 
without the fear of having his confidences revealed. Since the Defendan: 
8 
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appears to have had contact with at least two licensed psychologists at 
the Four Corners Mental Health Center (T. 113, 114), it would seem only 
in fair play to allow the defendant to expect that his confidences with 
each therapist would receive equal dignity and protection under the law. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
COUNT I FROM THE COMPLAINT AND IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH. 
At the time of Arraignment on December 21, 1977, Defendant moved 
to quash the Information upon the grounds that it charged more than one 
offense in violation of Section 77-23-3 (l) (g). It should be noted here 
that the Information charged one Count of Forcible Sodomy, two counts of 
Rape, and two Counts of Forcible Sexual Abuse. The Motion was denied 
and overruled. (Minute entry of Dec. 21, 1977, located at Minute Book No. 
16, page 32. Excerpt therefrom attached to Court file). At the com-
mencement of trial on March 20, 1978, Defendant moved to Strike Count I, 
Forcible Sodomy, from the Information for the reason that it would unduly 
prejudice the defendant and deprive him of a fair trial to try a sodomy 
case concurrently with two counts of Rape. The motion was denied and 
overruled. 
Section 77-23-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, provides: 
A Motion to Quash the Information or Indictment shall be 
available only on one or more of the following grounds. 
In the case of: (l) Either an information of indictment: 
(g) That there is more than one offense charged except 
as provided in section 77-21-31 of this Code. 
There can be no dispute that more than one offense was charged in 
the information. The issue is whether the multiple charges are permissible 
under Section 77-21-31. Said Section provides: 
9 
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I 
Two. ofr moret. off~nses may be charged in the same indictment ! 
or in orma ion in a separate count for each offense if t·, 
offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors orb tt 
are of simi ~ ar character or are based on two or more ac~i' 
or transact1 ons or on two or more acts or transactions 
t d t th . . con. nee e oge er or cons t l tut mg parts of a common scheme , ! pl an. o, , 
Defendant contends that Forcible Sodomy is an offense not simila·I 
in character and not based on the same act or transaction as the two Rae' 
charges contained in the information. Nor was the Sodomy count connecte: 
together with the Rape offenses or Sexual Abuse offenses as part of a 
common scheme oll" plan. Accordingly, the Motion to Quash should havebeir 
sustained. 
It is clear that rape and sodomy are separate and distinct offeni: 
each having its own elements. One is not included within the other. 111: 
legislature saw fit to distinguish the offense of rape from soda~~~ 
each offense its own definition, established different elements, prescrit;l 
different penalties, and gave each offense its own section number. Nott:I 
be overlooked is the gross perversion usually ascribed to sodomy as dis· 1 
tinguished from the offense of rape. The greatest dissimilarity between 
the two offenses would be that the offense of rape can only be cormnittea I 
by a male person upon a female while the offense of sodomy could be com· 
mitted by either male or female upon another person regardless of gender 
In the instant case the information itself shows that the Count! 
offense of Forcible Sodomy, alleged to have occurred on October 23, 1910 ' 
was remote in time and place from the two counts of rape alleged to have, 
occurred on September 11 , 1975, and March 15, 1977. The inf omation cha~~1 
that three different victims were involved and that they all occurred at 
considerably different times and places. This remoteness would seem to 
10 
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negate the assertion in this case of the rapes and sodomy being connected 
together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. Defendant 
submits that there is no evidence in the record to show that any forethought 
or planning was involved in the alleged commission of any of the offenses. 
Further, the record is devoid of any evidence of a scheme or plan which 
would tend to link the offenses together. 
The effect of the misjoinder is to prejudice the defendant in the 
eyes of the jury when he is tried in the same action for offenses which 
bear no reasonable relationship to each other. The jury could not help 
but be unduly influenced against the defendant during the testimony of 
Rosie Garcia and Petrita Garcia, having previously heard the information 
read to them alleging a count of sodomy .. 
In State v. Sanchez, 511 P.2d 1231 (Or. 1973), an Oregon statute 
permitted charging several crimes in a single indictment when they arose 
from "the same act or transaction." The Oregon Supreme Court held that 
in view of a previous case, State v. Brown, 497 P.2d 1191 (Or. 1972), two 
or more crimes are part of a single transaction when they are closely 
linked in time, place and circumstances. The Court stated in Sanchez: 
But even assuming the murder and robberies are one 
transaction, we perceive no basis for including the 
crime of theft in that transaction. That crime was 
committed hours after- the murder and blocks away. 
There is no overlap between the evidence of the mur-
der and robberies on the one hand, and the theft on 
the other hand. Accordingly, we conclude that at 
least the theft charge was improperly joined with 
the other counts. 511 P. 2d at 1234. 
Applying the principle of Sanchez to the instant case it is clear 
that there is no overlap of evidence between the sodomy charge and the 
two counts of rape. None of the testimony of Michael Garcia regarding 
the offense of.'J9Q~~ had any relationship to the rape offenses. 
11 
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The Oregon Court found two different transactions when they were cormnr" 
'•., 
blocks away from each other and hours apart. In the case at bar the 0i' 
were months and even more than a year a part and committed mil es from ei 
other. 
Consider also State v. Weitzel, 69 P.2d 958 (Or. 1937), whereir 
Oregon Supreme Court stated: 
Appellants complain of the admission in evidence of the fo11 
and circumstances surrounding the attempted rape. It is ass; 
that such evidence hs no relevancy to the charge of sodomy. i 
law is well settled that, when several criminal acts are 50 
connected with the defendant, with respect to time and local::, 
that they form an inseparable transaction, and a complete a(t 
of the offense charged in the indictment cannot be given wrn: 
detailing the particulars of such other acts, evidence oU 
entire transaction is admissible, even though it may disclo11 
the commission of another crime. . . 69 P. 2d at 963. 
The danger hinted at in Weitzel is that separate charges ~id~ 
are not connected in time and locality may well have no substantial rel1· 
vancy to each other . One would therefore not be admissible against Ute 
since that would violate the general rule that evidence of other crim~ 
not admissible. Since the crimes of sodomy and rape are not similar a~I' 
light of the fact that they bore no reasonable relation to each otheri~ 
time or place the Court should have sustained the Motion to Quash, and 
failing that, granted Defendant's Motion to Strike Count I and ordert~al 
it be tried in a separate action. 
CONCLUSION 
The verdicts and judgments pronounced upon the Defendant should 
be reversed and the cause remanded back to the Tri a 1 Court for a new 
trial for the reasons set forth in the preceding Points I, II and III. 
12 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Respectfully submitted, 
~~K~ 
BRYCE K. BRYNER - (/' 
155 So. Main 
Helper, Utah 84526 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, BRYCE K. BRYNER, hereby certify I personally served three (3) copies 
of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT upon Robert B. Hansen, 
Attorney General of the State of Utah, by personally delivering said 
three copies to the Office of the Attorney General at 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, this 28th day of August, 1978. 
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